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With Liberty and Justice For All?: The War on
Terror and the Controversial Separation of Powers
Between the Military's Authority to Detain "Enemy
Combatants" Vis-a-vis the Judiciary's Duty to
Review the Legality of All Executive Detentions
I. INTRODUCTION
At first blush, it seems axiomatic that the U.S. military may
properly seize and detain those individuals engaged in hostilities
with the United States and its armed forces. However, as with
many other legal issues facing our country in the wake of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 and the War on Terror, our military's, and our Presi-
dent's, authority to detain alleged "enemy combatants" without
affording them the traditional Procedural Due Process safeguards
guaranteed by our Constitution has created a sharp conflict that
has resulted in three recent Supreme Court pronouncements: Ra-
sul v. Bush,1Hamdi v. Rumsfeld2 , and Rumsfeld v. Padilla.'
This comment presents an overview of one of these important
and controversial cases, Rasul v. Bush, in which the Supreme
Court addressed the availability of habeas corpus to foreign na-
tionals detained abroad in connection with the United States
campaign against terror. In addition, this comment introduces
generally the writ of habeas corpus as the appropriate vehicle, if
any, for military detainees to challenge their detentions. Finally,
this comment presents and synthesizes some of the seminal his-
torical jurisprudence on the issue of military detentions of enemy
combatants.
It was noted that "[tihe war on terrorism has challenged the
traditional rhetoric and contemporary reality concerning the Bill
of Rights."' Due to the immediacy of this challenge, the issue is
now within the Supreme Court's province as the Court attempts to
provide guidance on the exact nature and scope of our traditional
1. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
2. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
3. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
4. Christopher E. Smith, The Bill of Rights after September 11'h: Principles or Pragma-
tism, 42 DUQ LAW REV 260 (2004).
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constitutional protections as applied to both citizens and aliens,
and in cases arising both domestically and abroad.
II. HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF VIs-A-vIs THE RIGHTS OF ENEMY
COMBATANTS
After the unthinkable attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States was quick to respond and retaliate. Throughout our mili-
tary campaign many suspected "enemy combatants" and terrorists
were captured and detained.' In a number of instances, as dis-
cussed below, those detained as enemy combatants were denied
access to counsel and to the courts, and received no review, judi-
cial or otherwise, of their detentions. Notably, it is claimed that
some of the alleged enemy combatants were never even informed
of any charges being asserted against them.
As stated in the introduction to this comment, complex constitu-
tional issues have arisen over what Due Process rights, if any,
should be afforded to those accused of being "enemy combatants" --
a term that is itself somewhat amorphous.6 Should these prison-
ers be notified of the charges, if any, against them? Should they
receive a hearing? Counsel? Most importantly, can these enemy
combatants even petition our courts in the first instance via the
writ of habeas corpus to challenge their detentions or the manner
in which such detentions are affected?
Perhaps the issue ought to be restated as follows: whether, in
military affairs, the detention of alleged enemy combatants is a
matter entrusted to the sole and absolute discretion of the Presi-
dent and Congress, such that these detentions are outside of the
ambit of judicial review and our customary Due Process safe-
guards, or whether the "Great Writ," Habeas Corpus, can be used
to challenge the basis for military detentions and provide a
mechanism to ensure that at least a minimal level of process is
provided to all individuals, citizens and aliens alike, who are in
military custody under color of authority of the United States.
5. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690 (noting that just at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base the U.S.
is holding approximately 640 foreign prisoners).
6. See Molly McDonough, Split Decision Divides Detainees' Fates: Supreme Court
Likely Will Have to Make Final Decision, ABA JOURNAL REPORT (2005), available at
httpJ/www.abanet.org/journal/ereporttf4gitmo.html (on file with author).
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A. Habeas Corpus
It is quotidian in American society to discuss the nature and ex-
tent of the Constitutional Rights we have always been afforded.
We know, for example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees us a
right to counsel.7 Additionally, we know we have a constitutional
protection against self-incrimination or coerced confessions.' We
are aware that, without probable cause, our authorities have no
power to search and/ or seize our persons or effects.9 Our Ameri-
can culture is infused with a constitutionally enforced more
against cruel and unusual punishment." Finally, and most impor-
tantly, we are all cognizant that nobody is to be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of the law.11
These basic rights form the foundation of American society. In-
deed, we fought a revolution to obtain them. As such, a safeguard
was, and still is, necessary to prevent the depletion of these rights.
Throughout our history it has always been the case that if these
constitutional protections are not followed and a party alleges that
he or she is unlawfully imprisoned, "the writ of habeas corpus is
his appropriate legal remedy."12
Habeas corpus is defined as "[a] writ employed to bring a person
before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party's impris-
onment or detention is not illegal."13 Statutorily, habeas corpus is
governed by 28 U.S.C.S. §2241, which provides: "Writs of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,
the district courts and any circuit judge within there respective
jurisdictions ... [as long as] a prisoner ... is in custody under...
the authority of the United States . . . "or the prisoner is "in cus-
tody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
,,14United States ....
Interestingly, neither the definition of habeas corpus nor its
governing statute distinguish between citizens and non-citizens,
or between those detained for violation of a criminal law and those
under some other form of Executive detention, such as a military
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 113 (1866) (quoting Holmes v. Jennison et al., 39 U.S.
540 (1840)).
13. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999).
14. 28 U.S.C. §2241(a), (c) (2004) (emphasis added).
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detention. It follows, if one was to look solely to the plain mean-
ings of this definition and governing statute, the writ of habeas
corpus appears to be available to anyone to challenge his or her
confinement.15 This, however, is counter-intuitive in at least one
respect -- as initially stated, it seems self evident that the military
can detain enemy fighters in the course of combat without the
usual concomitant burden of having to grant to the detainee an
immediate hearing upon petition to determine the legality of the
detention.
On the other hand, the question which necessarily arises is
whether the risk of erroneous, arbitrary, or illegal detentions and
overreaching by our government is any less prevalent in times of
war and national peril. One could argue that it is during times of
hostilities, when our American system of democracy is being chal-
lenged, that the Great Writ's availability is most important in or-
der to ensure that the principles upon which the Constitution was
created and for which our soldiers fight -- most significantly, indi-
vidual liberty -- are jealously guarded both domestically and
abroad.
B. Historical Availability of the Great Writ to Military Detainees
Three early seminal Supreme Court cases addressed the avail-
ability of the habeas corpus relief to those in military custody who
seek judicial review of their detentions. While one early, fact-
specific, case allowed a U.S. citizen in military custody to employ
the writ to challenge his detention, the later two adopted a nar-
rower application of the writ -- i.e., the court felt that habeas relief
was unavailable to enemy aliens and unlawful combatants, re-
gardless of whether these combatants were aliens or American
citizens.
The first Supreme Court case, Ex parte Milligan,16 decided
shortly after the Civil War, discussed the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts to consider a habeas petition brought by a citizen accused of
being an enemy combatant. 17 In restating the facts, Justice Davis
made the following precis:
15. See 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus §4 ("the legislature may not deprive any person of the
constitutional right to habeas corpus").
16. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
17. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §5-1 (7th ed. 2004 supp.).
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Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious states, or a
prisoner of war, but a citizen of Indiana for twenty years past,
and never in the military or naval service, is, while at his
home, arrested by the military power of the United States,
imprisoned, and, on certain criminal charges preferred
against him, tried, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged by a
military commission organized under the direction of the mili-
tary commander. .... "
Under these specific facts, the Milligan court permitted the al-
leged enemy combatant to request judicial review of his conviction
via the writ of habeas corpus. 9 Finding that "it is the birthright of
every American citizen when charged with a crime, to be tried and
punished according to the law" and that the "provisions of [the
Constitution] on the administration of criminal justice are too
plain and direct, to leave room for misconstruction," the Supreme
Court found that a military commission has no jurisdiction to try
citizens when the U.S. courts are open."
While Milligan's holding at first may appear to grant to the fed-
eral courts broad authority to review military detentions pursuant
to a petition for habeas, in actuality, the holding was interpreted
much more narrowly. Specifically, the Court appears to have lim-
ited its holding to petitions for a writ of habeas corpus brought by
a citizen who is arrested by a military commission in non-hostile
territory and who contests ever taking up arms against the U.S.
military.
The next case addressing the availability of habeas relief in a
military detention, Ex parte Quirin," is illustrative of the narrow
nature of Milligan. In Quirin, an opinion issued during World
War II, the Court denied leave to file petitions for habeas corpus
when several suspected saboteurs' (including one U.S. citizen)
sought review of their detentions." In accord with Milligan, the
court in Quirin posited that, while U.S. citizens are not subject to
the jurisdiction of a military tribunal so long as our Federal
Courts are operating, this rule is inapplicable to combatants,
whether the combatant is an American citizen or an alien. 3 The
18. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 118.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 119, 121.
21. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The Quirin opinion commonly has come to be known as the
"Nazi Saboteurs" case. ROTUNDA, supra, note 17 at §5-1.
22. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
23. ROTUNDA, supra, note 17 at §5-1.
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Court recognized one of the main contemporary arguments for
militarily detaining enemy combatants:
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of
measures by the military command not only to repel and de-
feat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary meas-
ures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede
our military effort have violated the law of war. 4
Furthermore, Quirin made the following distinction between
lawful combatants who must be afforded P.O.W. status in accor-
dance with the laws of war and unlawful combatants:
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful com-
batants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in
addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military
lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military
information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy
combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the
lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or
property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are gener-
ally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals.25
Because it was stipulated that all petitioners had received sabo-
tage training and came to the United States secretly and without
uniform to destroy American war facilities, 6 the court found mili-
tary jurisdiction proper."
In projecting this opinion, and the distinction between unlawful
and lawful combatants, into contemporary times, it would seem to
go without saying that the terrorists at war with the U.S., via
their unconventional and immoral panic and terror tactics, would
qualify as "unlawful combatants" under Quirin's definition.
Therefore, under the doctrine of stare decisis, if it applied, the
Quirin opinion would seem to dictate that the alleged enemy com-
24. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
25. Id. at 31 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 20-21.
27. Id. at 48.
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batants captured during our campaign against terror were prop-
erly being held by U.S. forces and that there is no obligation to
allow them access to federal courts to challenge their detentions.
However, it must be noted that this opinion was very fact spe-
cific. Notably, it was undisputed that all petitioners in Quirin had
come secretly onto American soil with destructive intentions. As
will be discussed with the Supreme Court's recent opinion, the
issue becomes more complicated when those captured deny that
they were ever engaged in hostilities with U.S forces and assert
that there is no foundation upon which to charge them as an en-
emy combatant. Furthermore, while the petitioners in Quirin
were denied access to our civil courts, they were nevertheless af-
forded a trial by military commission. 8 Today, indeed, one of the
arguments for affording alleged terrorists access to our courts is
that the military's prisoners are sometimes afforded no hearing or
review whatsoever.29
Finally, the third historical decision in addressing the detention
of enemy combatants was Johnson v. Eisentrager.° In Eisen-
trager, another WWII case,3 the Supreme Court seemed to further
foreclose the possibility of enemy soldiers petitioning United
States courts. Justice Jackson, speaking for the court, framed the
issue broadly. Specifically, he opined that the question was "one
of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-d-vis military
authorities in dealing with enemy aliens overseas."
In a 6-3 opinion,8 the Supreme Court held that the U.S. civil
courts have no jurisdiction over non-citizen enemy fighters cap-
tured and held in foreign territory.34 Justice Jackson argued that
"Executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered
by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential
to wartime security."5 The Court, however, was careful to distin-
28. Id. at 23.
29. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Kennedy J., concurring).
30. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
31. ROTUNDA, supra, note 17 at §5-1.
32. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765.
33. The majority opinion was authored by Justice Jackson and Justices Vinson, Reed,
Frankfurter, Clark, and Minton joined. Justice Black, with whom Justices Douglas and
Burton concurred, authored a dissenting opinion. Id. at 765, 791.
34. ROTUNDA, supra, note 17 at §5-1.
35. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 774. In support, Justice Jackson noted that a fundamental
tenet of habeas corpus is that the prisoner should be brought before the tribunal reviewing




guish cases involving citizens and, while it reserved judgment as
to the propriety of militarily detaining citizens captured as enemy
combatants,36 Justice Jackson took pains to address the fact that
"[c]itizenship is a high privilege."37 Nevertheless, as to the alien
petitioners in the case at bar, who were arrested for fighting in
violation of the laws of war after the surrender of their country,
and confined in a prison in Germany that was controlled by the
U.S. forces, the court found that they had no right, constitutional
or otherwise, to petition for habeas relief.
38
Eisentrager, especially when coupled with Quirin, seems to bar
the use of habeas corpus petitions by military detainees. In sum-
mary, Quirin held that admitted enemy combatants, captured in
the U.S., were properly subjected to military jurisdiction and thus
had no right to petition our federal courts for relief.39 Eisentrager
further expounded that military jurisdiction would lie over foreign
nationals captured and held abroad in U.S. controlled territory.
Finally, notwithstanding Justice Jackson's discourse on citizens'
heightened protections, Quirin unequivocally stated that citizens
acting as enemy combatants are properly subject to the jurisdic-
tion of a military tribunal.
It is important in analyzing these cases to recall that in both
Quirin and Eisentrager, the detainees at least received some
minimal process as they were charged and tried by military com-
mission -- again, a step our military apparently has not taken with
some of its current detentions. Nevertheless, these cases seem to
clearly establish a precedent for denying our federal courts juris-
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them
across the seas for hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space, guarding
personnel, billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for whatever
witnesses the prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to
defend the legality of sentence .... Such trials would hamper the war effort and bring
aid and comfort to the enemy....It would be difficult to devise a more fettering of a
field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission
to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from
the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.
Id. at 778-79.
36. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 769. Specifically, the court noted that citizens were "un-
touched" by this opinion. Id.
37. Id. at 770 (quoting United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467 (1928)).
38. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784.
39. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48; see also Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776-77 (stating that
"alien enemies resident in the country of the enemy could not maintain an action in its
courts during periods of hostilities" (citing Bell v. Chapman, 10 Johns. (N.Y.) 183; Jackson
v. Decker, 11 Johns. (N.Y.) 418; Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. (N.Y.) 70, 74-75; Caperton v.
Bowyer, 14 Wall. 216, 236; Masterson v. Howard, 18 Wall. 99, 105; Ex parte Colonna, 314
U.S. 510)).
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diction to review habeas petitions of those captured during hostili-
ties with our country. This precedent, however, for better or
worse, has proved malleable.
III. A NEW PARADIGM: THE FEDERAL COURTS' NEWLY VESTED
JURISDICTION TO REVIEW MILITARY DETENTIONS OF NON-CITIZEN
"ENEMY COMBATANTS" CAPTURED ABROAD
As noted, one of the three recent Supreme Court cases address-
ing the detention of enemy combatants is Rasul v. Bush." In Ra-
sul, the petitioners, 2 Australian citizens and 12 Kuwaiti citizens
who were captured in Afghanistan in the midst of the U.S.'s mili-
tary campaign against the Taliban, challenged the legality of their
detention in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, asserting that they were not enemy combatants and
that they were never charged or given access to counsel or to a
hearing in any tribunal.41
Justice Stevens initially phrased the issue as "whether the
United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider [habeas corpus]
challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals cap-
tured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba." In the controversial opin-
ion, the majority of the court, with a 6-to-3 vote," reversed both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals and held that the U.S.
federal courts do in fact have jurisdiction to hear such habeas peti-
tions."
In so holding, the court was quick to distinguish Eisentrager:
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detain-
ees in important respects: They are not nationals of countries
at war with the United States, and they deny that they have
40. 124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004).
41. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690-91. Allegedly, none of the detainees were even captured
by the United States. The "Kuwaiti detainees allege that [they] were taken captive 'by
local villagers seeking promised bounties or other financial rewards' while they were pro-
viding humanitarian aid in Afghanistan and Pakistan." Id. at 2691 n.4. One Australian
was allegedly captured by the Northern Alliance -- "a coalition of Afghan groups opposed to
the Taliban" -- and subsequently released into United States custody. Id. Finally, the
second Australian alleged that he was arrested by Pakistani authorities who turned him
over to American forces. Id.
42. Id. at 2690.
43. Id. at 2689. Justice Stevens, with whom Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsberg, and
Breyer joined, authored the majority opinion. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas, authored the dissent. Id.
44. Id. at 2692.
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engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United
States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal,
much less charged with and convicted of any wrongdoing; and
for more than two years they have been imprisoned in terri-
tory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdic-
tion and control.45
Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that Eisentrager only ad-
dressed the constitutional availability of habeas corpus to enemy
detainees: "The [Eisentrager] Court," Justice Stevens noted, "had
far less to say on the question of petitioners' statutory entitlement
to habeas review." 6
Therefore, ostensibly, Rasul did not hold that the detainees had
any constitutional right to habeas review. Rather, the Court
broadly held that because the Great Writ acts on the individual(s)
holding the prisoner, and not on the prisoner himself, a district
court can consider any habeas petition "as long as 'the custodian
can be reached by service of process."'47 This, the majority found,
was sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the petitioners' habeas
petitions. To this, the Court expounded that the habeas statute
does not discriminate on the basis of citizenship and applies
equally to extra-territorial detainees.4'8  Therefore, the Supreme
Court remanded the case with instructions that the district court
consider the merits of petitioners' claims and to address the "legal-
ity of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individu-
als who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing."9
IV. ANALYSIS
Several oddities in the Rasul opinion seem patently obvious.
While reserving judgment on the propriety of Rasul's holding, and
taking into account that any thorough analysis regarding that
would necessarily be a treatise unto itself, it is, nevertheless, nec-
essary to examine the peculiarities of the opinion.
First, it is interesting that Justice Stevens quoted Justice Jack-
son, the author of the majority opinion for Eisentrager and on the
panel for the Quirin opinion, both of which dismissed habeas peti-
45. Id. at 2693.
46. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2694.
47. Id. at 2695.
48. Id. at 2696.
49. Id. at 2699.
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tions brought by military detainees for want of jurisdiction, as au-
thority in reaching his conclusion that habeas review should be
available to those detained in Guantanamo Bay.50
In addition, the majority relied on both Ex parte Milligan and
Ex parte Quirin, discussed supra, in reaching the conclusion that
the writ has historically been available to challenge military de-
tentions.51 First, as previously mentioned, Milligan was very fact
specific in that it dealt with an American citizen, not a combatant,
captured in non-hostile territory in the U.S.52
As Professor Rotunda of George Mason University School of
Law correctly explains, Milligan was interpreted narrowly and, to
boot, the narrow interpretation was by none other than Quirin.3
Specifically, Professor Rotunda stated that "Quirin held that rules
protecting civilians from courts martial while civil courts can func-
tion and are open, do not insulate combatants from military juris-
diction . . . ."" The apparent implication of this is that if combat-
ants are subject to military jurisdiction, they are not entitled to
the general protection of judicial oversight by the use of the writ of
habeas corpus to challenge their militarily sanctioned detentions.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens specifically cited Quirin for sup-
port on the following statement:
Consistent with the historic purpose of the writ, this Court
has recognized the federal courts' power to review applica-
tions for habeas relief in a wide variety of cases involving ex-
ecutive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace.
The court has, for example, entertained the habeas petitions.
. . of admitted enemy aliens convicted of war crimes during a
declared war and held in the United States.55
The Court's construction of Quirin as such appears to miscon-
strue that opinion's disposition. Indeed, such a statement seems
antithetical to Quirin's holding. As previously noted, Quirin held
50. Id. at 2692. Justice Stevens quoted Justice Jackson's statement that "[e]xecutive
imprisonment has been considered oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede,
pledged that no free man should be imprisoned, disposed, outlawed, or exiled save by the
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." Id. (quoting Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel.
Mezei, 73 S. Ct. 625 (1953) (Jackson J. dissenting)).
51. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693.
52. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107.
53. ROTUNDA, supra, note 17 at §5-1.
54. Id.
55. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2692-93.
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that is was proper for the military, not the federal courts, to exer-
cise jurisdiction over admitted combatants.
It is, therefore, confusing to see the Court postulate that Quirin
provides precedent for federal courts' review of habeas petitions.
Justice Stone, who authored Quirin, could not have been much
clearer: "The Court holds: The motions for leave to file petitions for
writs of habeas corpus are denied."6 The Supreme Court did not
say, as some commentators suggest, that pursuant to the writ, the
district court could make a limited factual inquiry of the basis for
the detentions. On the contrary, the Supreme Court would not
allow the writ of habeas corpus to be filed.
To take this analysis one step further, the question as to why
the majority in Rasul saw fit to cite Quirin becomes even more
perplexing when juxtaposed with Justice Steven's extended dis-
course on the importance of the fact that the prisoners in Rasul
were held in Guantanamo Bay, a place in which the U.S. exercised
"complete jurisdiction and control." 7 Indeed, the fact that the
prisoners were held at Guantanamo Bay, as opposed to being held
in territory which was merely controlled by the military (such as a
United States occupied prison in Germany as in Eisentrager), was
one of the factors leading the Court to conclude that Eisentrager
was distinguishable and, hence, not controlling. 58
However, assuming, arguendo, this distinction is valid -- i.e.,
even if the Court could properly find that prisoners in a United
States occupied prison in Germany had no right to the writ but
prisoners in Guantanamo Bay (which has a greater similarity to
territory over which the U.S. is a sovereign due to its Lease
Agreement executed with Cuba") may petition for habeas ---
Quirin seems to vitiate the distinction's import. Once again, in
Quirin, the Supreme Court denied leave to file writs of habeas
corpus to military detainees held in the United States." Consider-
ing the fact that enemy combatants captured and held in America
have been restricted from employing the Great Writ, it appears
illogical to rule that alleged enemy combatants captured abroad
and held in a U.S. naval base in Cuba can have unrestricted ac-
cess to our courts in order to have their detentions reviewed.
56. Quirin, 63 S. Ct. at 21 (emphasis added).
57. Rasul, 124 S. Ct at 2690-91.
58. Id. at 2693.
59. Id. at 2691 n.2 (citing Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903,
U.S.-Cuba, Art. III, T.S. No. 418).
60. Quirin, 63 S. Ct. at 7-8.
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Finally, there is one other point to address regarding Rasul.
The majority opinion framed the issue as "whether the habeas
statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of Execu-
tive detentions of aliens in a territory over which the United
States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction."' The major-
ity found that the petitioners had a right to petition for habeas
relief, with the issue broadly framed as such, and with a narrow
interpretation of Eisentrager to the following "critical" facts -- a
prisoner arrested that
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been . . . in the United
States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there
held in military custody ... ; (d) was tried and convicted by a
military commission... and is at all times imprisoned outside
the United States.62
However, it can be argued that Eisentrager was much broader
than Rasul's narrow interpretation implies. Indeed, the broad na-
ture of Eisentrager becomes particularly apparent upon review of
how Justice Jackson phrased the issue in that case. "The ultimate
question," Jackson explained, "is one of jurisdiction of civil courts
of the United States vis-&-vis military authority in dealing with
enemy aliens overseas." 3 Therefore, the Eisentrager's disposition,
a denial of leave to file habeas petitions, seems to suggest that the
civil courts did not have the authority to deal with enemy aliens.
Thus, Eisentrager, especially when coupled with Quirin, should
have controlled the outcome in Rasul. To this, even Justice Ken-
nedy, in his concurrence, recognized that any decision on this is-
sue should have been done in the framework established by Eisen-
trager.
64
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and despite the opinion's devia-
tion from precedent that was palpably on point, there is strong
merit to the majority's disposition in Rasul. First and foremost, it
appears to have been stipulated in both Eisentrager and Quirin
that the petitioners were admitted enemy aliens. This being the
case, there is less need for them to employ the writ to challenge
the factual predicates to their detentions.
61. Rasul, 124 S. Ct at 2693.
62. Id.
63. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765.
64. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (Kennedy J., concurring).
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Additionally, in both Eisentrager and Quirin, the petitioners
were afforded a trial by military tribunal. In Rasul, it is alleged
that that none of the prisoners were "charged with any wrongdo-
ing, permitted to consult with counsel, or provided access to the
courts or any other tribunal."65
As Justice Kennedy noted, the prisoners in Eisentrager,
"[hiaving already been subject to procedures establishing their
status, . .. could not justify 'a limited opening of our courts' to
show that they were 'of friendly personal disposition' and not en-
emy aliens."6 Where, however, the military detainees profess that
they never even took up arms against the United States, as was
the case in Rasul, a more compelling case is made for judicial re-
view. Justice Kennedy explicated that "[ilndefinite detentions
without trial or other proceedings presents altogether different
considerations," which both weaken the considerations of military
necessity warrant and judicial oversight.67
It follows from this analysis that one possible solution is for the
military to follow standard procedures, created by the Congress
and the President, for affording to detainees trials by military tri-
bunals.68 And while not a panacea, this would appear to bring to-
day's detentions in line with historical practice and satisfy, at
least to some degree, the often overactive American conscience.
Separate and distinct from these two problems -- i.e., prisoners
contesting that they ever took up arms against the United States
and the absence of military hearings -- is the issue of who even
qualifies as an "enemy combatant" in the first instance, such that
they may be militarily detained. One district court recently ruled
that "the term 'enemy combatant' is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad." 9 The judge found that, as the term is currently em-
ployed,
enemy combatants could include 'a little old lady in Switzer-
land who writes checks' to a charity she thinks is aiding Af-
ghanistan orphans but is really a front for al-Qaida. Or it
could be a person who teaches English to the son of an al-
65. Id. at 2691.
66. Id. at 2700 (Kennedy J., concurring) (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778).
67. Id. at 2700-01.
68. See McDonough, supra, note 6 (Noting that currently, there is a process in place for
the military to review and evaluate detentions known as the Combatant Status Review
Tribunal, but this process is claimed by some to be deficient because the prisoners are pro-
hibited both from consulting with counsel and from reviewing the military's evidence).
69. Id.
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Qaida member, or a journalist who knows where Osama Bin
Laden is but refuses to divulge the information to protect a
source.
70
In the end, it is difficult to draw an exact line of demarcation be-
tween the military's and the President's power to subject sus-
pected enemy combatants to its sole jurisdiction and the judici-
ary's power to oversee these Executive detentions. This contro-
versy is, at root, a separation of powers dispute between the
President's and Congress' monopoly in the foreign affairs and mili-
tary arenas, and the Supreme Court's ubiquitous role in ensuring
strict adherence to our founding document.
Even in the face of Rasul's unambiguous holding -- that jurisdic-
tion to consider habeas petitions lies whenever the custodian of
the prisoner can be reached by service of process -- district courts
are still without certainty. It has been noted that district courts
"are struggling to interpret and elaborate on the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Rasul v. Bush . . . that foreigners can appeal
their detentions by the U.S. military in U.S. courts."71
It was once noted by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit that
"j]udges too often tell defendants what the defendants [such as
President Bush and the U.S. military in the instant case] cannot
do without indicating what they can do, thus engendering legal
uncertainty that foments further litigation." That truism may be
fittingly applied to this Supreme Court opinion.72
As of the date of this article, two federal district courts in the
District of Columbia have issued opinions with opposing views
regarding the alleged enemy combatants' rights to a substantive
review of their cases.73 In In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, No.
02-CV-0299 (1/3112005), Judge Joyce Hens Green held that "the
Fifth Amendment protects and applies to detainees . . ." and "for-
eign terror suspects held at Guantanamo Bay . . . should be al-
lowed to challenge their detention."74
However, in Khalid v. Bush, No. 04-1142 (1119/2005), Judge
Richard J. Leon, determined that Rasul stood only for the proposi-
tion that U.S. courts could consider the legality of the Executive's
potentially indefinite detention of individuals and that it did not
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 501 (1997).
73. Id.
74. McConough, supra, note 6.
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establish a rule that purported terrorists possessed "substantive
rights on the merits of their claims."75 In accordance with his con-
clusion, Judge Leon held that "the Pentagon's system for review-
ing detentions is adequate and that the detainees had no writ to
seek habeas corpus relief."76
As evidenced by these opinions, there is still no clear answer on
the proper constitutional, statutory, or natural rights, if any, that
must be afforded to those accused of being enemy combatants and
terrorists. To that end, it is expected that the issue will find its
way back to the Supreme Court's docket.77
Hopefully, upon reconsideration, the Supreme Court will once
and for all clearly define the category of persons that fall within
the classification of "enemy combatants" and the proper due proc-
ess to which these persons are entitled, taking appropriate notice
of the Court's historical jurisprudence, the country's current mo-
res, and the hardship that could be imposed on our military if our
commanders were distracted from active military affairs in order
to respond to habeas complaints. All this must be delicately bal-
anced with the injustice that could result from the indefinite de-
tention of even one potentially innocent foreigner. For now, suf-
fice to say, the issue is anything but resolved.
Michael J. Crossey, Jr.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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